evidence from The Czech Republic by Juracka, Tomas
 
 
 
 
 
The Lending Channel of the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy: 
Evidence from The Czech Republic 
 
By 
 
Tomas Juracka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
 
2011 
 
2 
 
The Lending Channel of the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy: 
Evidence from The Czech Republic 
 
By 
 
Tomas Juracka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted to 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
 
2011 
Professor Joong Ho Han

II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby sincerely thank Professor Han Joong Ho for all the help and time he has 
provided me with.
III 
 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... IV 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
2. The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy and its Channels ................................. 2 
3. The Issue of Efectiveness .................................................................................................... 3 
4. Ways to achieve better effectiveness .................................................................................. 5 
5. Brief History of the Banking in the Czech Republic .......................................................... 6 
6. Empirical Specifications ................................................................................................... 16 
7. The Problems with Panel Data Sets in Finance................................................................. 17 
8. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 23 
References ................................................................................................................................ 24 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 28 
 
IV 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the lending channel of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, particularly on its strength in the Czech Republic. First, the transmission 
mechanism and its channels are discussed. Second, the literature on the topic is 
reviewed, including many different views on the strength of the channels.  Third, a brief 
history of Czech banking system is provided to explain the specifics of its evolution in 
the past two centuries. Fourth, an empirical model is developed based on the model 
introduced by Kashyap and Stein. The model is significantly altered to suit the character 
of the data available on the Czech Republic. Based on this model, the strength of the 
lending channel in the Czech Republic is questionable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
During the recent financial crisis, the monetary policy of financial institutions holds a 
new importance. The question of which monetary policy is effective is more crucial 
than ever. Unfortunately, however, many important channels of transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy have weakened over time as will be shown later. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the role of bank lending channel as a monetary 
policy channel in the Czech Republic. 
There have been few earlier attempts to delve into the topic. Buchlikova (2001) explores 
microeconomic aspects of the lending channel of the transmission mechanism of the 
monetary policy which could not be uncovered by analysis of aggregate data. Her study 
focuses only on corporate loans. Another interesting paper, Pruteanu (2004), focuses on 
year 1996 – 2001 and examines two channels of the transmission mechanism – interest 
rate and credit channels. Mandel (1996) uncovered the problem of the stability of 
money velocity in the Czech Republic in his paper. Unlike the previous work, the 
purpose of this paper is to focus on the lending channel of the transmission mechanism 
and assess its strength based on the model build upon the data from years 1992 to 2009. 
The argumentation is developed in several logical steps. Firstly, the desirability of 
monetary policy is briefly addressed. Secondly, the transmission mechanism is 
introduced and the reasons why it is weakening are explained. And finally, suggestions 
for improvement in effectiveness of monetary policy are presented. 
The monetary policy of central banks is faced with new challenges. There seems to be 
widely spread agreement among the governing authorities that at least financial sector 
needs paternalistic control of benevolent and enlightened regulatory body. This body is 
expected to only follow the best interests of society. How dangerous and malign this 
belief is, has been developed in the works of many great economists (Osterfeld 2009; 
Rothbard 1962; Mises 1949; Hayek 1973-1979). 
In spite of these strong objections, it is inevitable fact that politicians must show some 
effort in coping with current crisis if they want to be elected again, a fact that can hardly 
be overlooked. Also, a myriad of reasons in favour of reasonable regulation and 
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governmental interference was developed over the past century (Buchanan 1985, 
Krugman 2010A, Krugman 2010B). If arguments like information asymmetry, moral 
hazard and extremely harmful effects of the collapse of financial system are taken into 
consideration, the grounds for the regulation and monetary policy seem to be steady.  
It is not a purpose of this thesis to fully discuss the desirability of the monetary policy 
and in order to address this issue the reference to some of the relevant literature was 
provided. However if the monetary policy is as widely accepted concept as it is among 
policy practitioners in the Czech Republic, the importance of highest possible efficiency 
in the conduct of the monetary policy cannot be overlooked. For this reason the strength 
and reliability of one of the most important channels, the lending channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism, is examined for the Czech Republic.  
First the overall view of transmission mechanism of monetary policy and its efficiency 
will be presented, then the brief history of the Czech banking, followed by the analytical 
part with a model testing the existence of the lending channel of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in the Czech Republic.  
 
2. The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy and its Channels 
Even if we deem monetary policy desirable, the question of their effectiveness rises. To 
discuss this topic further, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy must be 
explained first. The effects of changes in monetary policy take place through several 
steps and channels which are collectively called transmission mechanism.  
As concisely explained in George at al. (n.d.), the changes in interest rates of central 
bank (such as discount rate) first influence market interest rates (e.g. bank deposit rates, 
consumer loan rates). Moreover, any forms of policy action and announcements have 
impact on expectations of all the agents in the economy about the performance of the 
economy and their confidence in these expectations. Furthermore, asset prices as well as 
exchange rates are affected.  In the second phase of the transmission mechanism, 
previous changes influence “the spending, saving and investment behaviour of 
individuals and firms in the economy” (pg. 3). In the third phase, the effects depend on 
“the level of demand relative to domestic supply capacity” (pg. 3). So if for example 
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demand for labour is higher than the supply, the wages will rise (provided there are no 
frictions in the labour market) and this increase will lead to higher prices charged by the 
employers. In the final stage, the movements in exchange rates lead to direct and often 
delayed effects on the domestic prices of the foreign goods and services and to indirect 
effects on the prices of substitutes of the imported goods and services. These two effects 
together impact inflation. 
The transmission mechanism is often divided into channels. All the effects described 
hold under the condition of ceteris paribus. The interest rate channel stands for increase 
(decrease) in official interest rates which subsequently leads to lower (higher) spending 
and declining (rising) overall price level as a result. Furthermore, credit channel stands 
for changes in loan activity of banks and other loan providers as the value of collaterals 
changes in response to changes in monetary policy variables while money channel 
refers to changes in bank liabilities. By exchange rate channel we mean the increasing 
(decreasing) exchange rate due to higher (lower) official interest rate which in turn 
makes assets in domestic currency more (less) attractive for foreign investors. The asset 
channel is the increase (decrease) in official interest rate leading to the change of long-
term market interest rate in the same direction and consequently to lower (higher) price 
of bonds and securities due to discounting of future incomes. Finally, the balance sheet 
channel introduced in Ashcraft and Campello (2007) stands on the presumption that 
“higher interest rates increase debt service, erode cash flows, and depress collateral 
values” (pg. 1516) and hence decrease demand for loans. 
 
3. The Issue of Efectiveness 
After explanation of the terminology, the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism 
can at last be discussed. Unfortunately, there seems to be a lot of evidence suggesting 
that the traditional channels of transmission mechanism are weakening. Specifically, 
large banks, banks that are part of financial conglomerate and banks with a lot of 
liquidity are less responsive to monetary contractions (Kashyap & Stein 2000) because 
they do not need to rely on the loans from the central bank in response to the squeeze in 
liquidity. Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999) provide evidence that the credit channel is 
weak across Europe as loans of banks do not respond to monetary policy. Égert and 
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MacDonald (2008) state that exchange rate, asset price and credit channels are all weak 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Ferreira (2009) proves that banks are less 
responsive to changes in monetary policy as their “degree of foreign dependence and 
indebtedness” (pg. 8) grows. As shown in Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ferreira (2009), 
large majority of the banks in USA and EU exhibit “high degree of foreign dependence 
and indebtedness” (Ferreira 2009, pg. 8) and are large or a part of large financial 
conglomerate and for that reason they are less responsive to monetary policy.  
On top of all these deficiencies, expansionary monetary policy was applied to boost the 
economy and more and more commercial banks enjoyed excess liquidity as most 
developed countries struggled with the effects of the crisis. This effect was amplified by 
the fact that banks are less willing to lend money in the crisis. Apart for making the 
bank less responsive to monetary policy, excess liquidity also leads to immoral practices 
and more risky behaviour of the commercial banks because excess funds provide 
incentive to accept otherwise unacceptable risks. Also, scarce resources are used for 
inefficient uses as the loans provided to risky subject serve as means to buy scarce 
resources which are then used in endeavours which would be too risky if there was no 
excessive liquidity and therefore are wasteful (for more viz. Hunt 2007). The incentive 
to provide loans to riskier subjects is however partially offset by the banks’ temporary 
unwillingness to lend money due to the crisis. 
That does not conclude all the issues with transmission mechanism. Speculative channel 
(Hannsgen 2004) is another problematic point. Rapid and frequent changes in interest 
rates damage the economy due to speculative attacks.  
Strong evidence for functioning channels of transmission mechanism is harder to find. 
Nevertheless, Ashcraft and Campello (2007) found strong evidence that balance sheet 
channel is firm, although this “channel accounts for only 14% of the aggregate response 
of bank lending to a policy innovation after four quarters [and] it explains about one-
third of the aggregate response after eight quarters” (pg. 1516), which means that this 
channel is significant but does not explain majority of the reactions to the policy 
changes. As all previously presented studies clearly show, there is little doubt in the fact 
that transmission mechanism of monetary policy is weakening.  
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4. Ways to achieve better effectiveness 
Now that the current deficiencies of transmission mechanism have been introduced, 
some examples of possible solutions can be addressed. The desirability of active 
monetary policy seems to be generally accepted at least in the political arena. If so, then 
the responsible authorities should make sure that such policy is effective. Therefore it is 
desirable to achieve stronger control over the financial markets to make monetary policy 
more effective.  
The monetary policy stops being effective if interbanking loan rate leaves brackets 
given by overnight deposit and loan rates of central bank, in other words when there is 
too much or too little liquidity in the market. But how does this apply to the nonbanking 
loan providers which form majority of providers in USA, as bank loans form only 30 
per cent of total debt liabilities of non-financial firms in the U.S. (Favero, Giavazzi & 
Flabbi 1999)? Their interest rate is not directly affected by this system. This could be 
solved by taking non-banking loan providers under the present regulatory umbrella, thus 
forcing them to meet similar standards as commercial banks. 
Another, more important problem, lies with financial conglomerates which can find 
alternative internal sources of liquidity, as already mentioned. This could possibly be 
settled by greater control over them and also extended cooperation among central banks 
of different countries. Such approach would however go against flexibility of monetary 
policy in the sense of adapting to local conditions. Other possible measure is the power 
to break up the conglomerates if they are too large and can endanger and destabilize the 
financial system.  
This approach would however possibly create more problems – it would be a powerful 
tool for governmental extortion of large private conglomerates. Such measures should 
be avoided, but for their inevitable appeal to the authorities they will most probably be 
implemented sooner or later. Thus the danger of power concentration should never be 
underestimated. As a general rule, whenever a new regulatory institution is created or an 
old one is endowed with a new power, it should be put under due scrutiny of responsible 
representatives of the public to ensure that the power will not be abused and this power 
should only be given when considered necessary. 
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The contemporary importance of monetary policy is hardly deniable. However, as many 
studies cited in this paper prove, most of the channels of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy are weak. If the authorities do not want to resign on the monetary 
policy, they must take actions to counter the factors weakening the mechanism. Few 
examples of such measures have been presented, such as control and regulations over 
non-banking loan providers, cooperation among central banks and power to break up 
financial conglomerates. The public representatives should however deeply consider 
pros and cons before applying any of these measures. 
 
5. Brief History of the Banking in the Czech Republic 
In order to make understanding of certain features of Czech banking system easier for 
the reader, history of Czech banking is introduced. 
Modern banking started to develop in the Czech lands at the beginning of the 19th 
century but it was slower than in other parts of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire of which 
the Czech lands were part of. The reason for that was that the original mode of 
production was mostly agricultural up to the middle of the 19th century, so there was no 
need for extensive bank services. Only in the second half of the 19th century did the 
industrial development ask for fast evolution of banking sector (Pospisil, Hobza & 
Puchinger 2006, pg. 16). 
Prior to foundation of the first Czech banks, Austrian banks operated in the Czech lands 
but they did not support development of the Czech business sector. Newly created 
Czech banks attempted to fill this hole in the market. The first Czech bank was První 
občanská záložna (First Civil Savings Bank) founded in 1857 followed by Hypoteční 
banka Království českého (Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Bohemia) in 1864 and 
Živnostenská banka pro Čechy a Moravu (Trade Bank for Bohemia and Moravia) in 
1868. Especially the latter undergone quick and intense development. Foundation of 
Prague stock exchange in 1871 had a strong influence on further evolution of banking 
sector in Czech lands as it induced rising interest in trading stock and contributed to 
founding new bank houses in the Czech lands (Pospisil, Hobza & Puchinger 2006, pg. 
16). 
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The crisis of 1873 had profound negative impact on Czech banking sector. It also 
affected price fluctuations in Prague stock exchange. Plummeting prices of stocks of 
enterprises which were also clients of banks led to decline in the stock prices of bank 
houses and as a consequence liquidity of the banks significantly deteriorated.  The end 
of the 1870s was then marked with rapid liquidation of the most of the Prague banks, 
with only Živnostenská banka pro Čechy a Moravu surviving the turmoil. When the last 
echoes of the crisis dissipated, the Czech banking sector slowly stabilized in the 1890s. 
Fast development of banks can later be observed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Table 1 shows the number of banks in the Czech lands in 1910 (Pospisil, Hobza & 
Puchinger 2006, pg. 17). 
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Table 1 - Number of Banks in the Czech Lands in 1910 
Kind of Bank 
Number of 
Banks 
Czech Joint-Stock Banks 12 
Land Banks 6 
Subsidiaries and Expositures of the Czech Banks 33 
German Banks (Joint-Stock Banks of Czech Germans) 10 
Subsidiaries of the German Joint-Stock Banks 34 
Subsidiaries of Vienna Banks 62 
Subsidiaries of Other Banks of Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire 21 
Secondary Loan House (Ltds) 62 
Sum 240 
    The table was retrieved adapted from Pospisil, Hobza and 
Puchinger (2006, pg. 17) 
Other parts of financial sector were developing at the same time, especially institutions 
focused on savings of and providing loans to mainly low-income households and 
middle class. Most important of these institutions were savings banks. First of them, 
Schraňovací pokladnice pro hlavní město Prahu a Čechy (Treasury House for the 
Capital City Prague and Bohemia), was founded in 1820 and since 1860 was known as 
Česká spořitelna (Czech Savings Bank), the bank with the longest tradition in the Czech 
Republic and one of the two largest Czech banks. Over the years the number of the 
savings banks flourished – there were 351 savings banks operating in Czechoslovakia 
by the year 1936. Apart from the savings banks, a myriad of small savings unions 
provided savings services, gave credit to individual enterpreneurs and  supported other 
activities, namely collective buying. More specialized civil savings unions provided 
loan operations, bill of exchange operations and even larger mortgages except for 
accepting deposits.All these institutions focused on low-income and middle class 
strongly contributed to economic stability of the country, especially after the World War 
I. As was shown, the Czech banking system in pre-socialist era was characterized by 
very large number of relatively small banks and other financial institutions with similar 
functions (Pospisil, Hobza & Puchinger 2006). 
The promising development of the banking system in the Czechoslovakia was disrupted 
by the adoption of the Soviet banking model after 1948. The most significant 
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characteristic of this system was centralization of functions of commercial and central 
banking into one institution. This functional concentration enabled using banks as a 
very effective element of control in the planned economy (Pospisil, Hobza & Puchinger 
2006, pg. 17).  
However, the banking system was slightly more complicated in reality even after 1948. 
The center of the system was Státní banka československá (State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia) founded in 1950, which concentrated the functions of the commercial 
banks and the central bank. Single savings banks and unions were transformed into state 
savings houses and their centralization was finished in 1967 when these were merged 
into one institution which was shortly after split into two institutions Česká státní 
spořitelna and Slovenská státní spořitelna (Czech State Savings House and Slovak State 
Savings House) because of forming of the federation. Živnostenská banka pro Čechy a 
Moravu (Trade Bank for Bohemia and Moravia) aquired exception in the new system 
and remained as a provider of international bank operations for individuals and selected 
foreign currency operations. Investiční banka (Investent bank) formed in 1958 served as 
a loan provider to state and cooperative companies and its functions were later 
transferred to Státní banka československá. The last important institution in socialist era 
banking was Československá obchodní banka (Czechoslovakian trade bank) which 
started its existence in 1965 as a result of efforts to create a new economic model in 
mid-60s. This bank, known as ČSOB, continued its existence even after the end of the 
socialist era to become one of the two largest banks in the Czech Republic(Pospisil, 
Hobza & Puchinger 2006, pg. 18). 
The fall of socialism in 1989 meant gradual change of banking system back from one 
stage to two stage system. Politicaly unacceptable banking reform from the middle of 
1980s was the cornerstone of the new legislation passed on the 1st of January 1990. 
State Bank of Czechoslovakia was redefined as an independent central bank with unique 
emission power under a name of Česká národní banka (Czech National Bank). Three 
new universal commercial banks were created. These banks remained in the state 
ownership for several next years. Creation of new commercial banks was allowed with 
minimal equity requirement of only 50 million CZK (approximately 3 million USD; this 
ammount was later raised to 300 million CZK, approximately 18 million USD). New 
laws also allowed for the entry of foreign banks into the Czech market (Pospisil, Hobza 
& Puchinger 2006, pg. 18).  
10 
 
The transition faced several severe problems. The problem number one were loans to 
state companies which could hardly be repaid. These loans were previously provided on 
the basis of governmental planning policy without considering the probability of returns. 
These bad loans would cause troubles to newly created commercial banks in 
competitive environment. Instead, a state institution, Konsolidační banka 
(Consolidation Bank),  administered these loans. Second, no less significant, problem 
was the creation of new economical structure – necessity to create and support small 
and middle sized companies. Českomoravská záruční a rozvojová banka (Bohemian and 
Moravian Guarance and Development Bank) was established to fulfill this task with 
50 % equity provided by state and 50 % by large commercial banks. Another significant 
change in this period was renewed membership in IMF (Pospisil, Hobza & Puchinger 
2006, pg. 18, 19).  
The year 1993 was marked with separation of Czech and Slovak Republic and creation 
of a new currency. The development in 1990s can be characterized as a time of 
economic growth. However, certain instability affected banking sector in this period, 
stemming mostly from continued loan provisions to state companies which could not 
cope in the new market structure, lack of experience of bank employees, deliberate 
fraud and problematic assessments of the projects of the new private firms. These 
problems were amplified in its gravity with new small banks. Central bank had to step 
in and solve the situation in 1996 under a „Consolidation programme II“ (the first stage 
of this programme was marked with creation of Consolidation Bank) (Pospisil, Hobza 
& Puchinger 2006, pg. 19). 
One of the important specifics of Czech banking system came into existence in 1993 
when commercial building savings societies was allowed. (Pospisil, Hobza & Puchinger 
2006, pg. 19, 20). These societies provide opportunities to individuals to save money for 
buying flats and houses with certain state subsidy. These subsidy along with the fact 
that the money could be used on other expenses than just building expenses led to the 
fact that this kind of saving was by far the most profitable. 
Bad loans remained the biggest problem in years 1996 and 1997 when a crisis hit the 
Czech banking system. The share of bad loans on total assets was 32 %. The crisis had 
strongest impact on small banks. However, next crisis in years 1999 and 2000 hit even 
three largest banks which were considered „too big to fail“ – namely Česká spořitelna, 
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Komerční banka and Investiční a poštovní banka (Investment and Post Bank). The latter 
had to be bailed out by the state and not even later sale of the bank could offset the huge 
costs of the operation. Overall costs of state interventions in banking sector between 
years 1990 and 2004 are estimated to 600 billion CZK (approximately 35 billions USD) 
(Revenda 2005). 
In 1997, Czech banking system undergone abrupt monetary crisis which led to relaxing 
and later to leaving fixed exchange rate in favour of floating rate with fine-tuning 
interventions. The managed floating exchange rate was officially adopted on the 26th of 
May 1997 after many unsuccesful attempts to maintain the fixed rate with gradually 
extended floating range (Kocarnik 2007, pg. 1, 2). 
During 1990s the three biggest commercial banks were privatized. ČSOB for example 
was privatized in 1999 (Vencovsky 1999, pg. 500 – 506). The minimal equity 
requirements kept on rising over the years. Creation of deposit insurance scheme 
increased public trust in the banking system. Gradually also mortgage banks and 
savings and loan unions were alowed (Pospisil, Hobza & Puchinger 2006, pg. 20). For 
illustration, Table 2 and a Figures 1 and 2 describe the number of banks between 1990 
and 2004 in the Czech Republic is provided.  
 
Table 2 Number of Banks in 1990-2004 
Date 
Number of 
banks 
Banks with 
Decisive 
Czech Share 
Banks with 
Decisive 
Foreign 
Share 
1.1.1990 5 5 0 
31.12.1990 9 9 0 
31.12.1991 24 20 4 
31.12.1992 37 26 11 
31.12.1993 52 34 18 
31.12.1994 55 34 21 
31.12.1995 55 32 23 
31.12.1996 53 30 23 
31.12.1997 50 26 24 
31.12.1998 45 20 25 
31.12.1999 42 15 27 
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31.12.2000 40 14 26 
31.12.2001 38 12 26 
31.12.2002 37 11 26 
31.12.2003 35 9 26 
31.12.2004 35 9 26 
   Data for the table retrieved form CNB (2001) and CNB (2004). 
Before moving on to the next part, a short overview of the present state of the banking 
system in the Czech Republic is offered. Tables 3 and 4 list the resident and affiliated 
banks active in the Czech Republic, respectively. Figure 3 shows the changing levels of 
the discount rate over the years 1990 – 2009. Table 5 and Figure 4 present the evolution 
of the size of the banking sector in the Czech Republic and the level of deposits and 
loans from clients over the years 2002 – 2010.   
 
Table 3 - Banks with Residence in the Czech Republic 
Name of Bank Active Since 
Banco Popolare Česká republika 1994 
Citibank Eurobank 1991 
Česká exportní banka 1995 
Česká spořitelna 1969 
Českomoravská stavební spořitelna 1993 
Českomoravská záruční a rozvojová banka 1992 
Československá obchodní banka 1965 
Evropsko-ruská banka 2009 
Fio banka, a.s. 2010 
GE Money Bank 1998 
Hypoteční banka 1991 
J&T BANKA 1992 
Komerční banka 1990 
LBBW Bank CZ 1990 
Modrá pyramida stavební spořitelna 1993 
PPF banka 1993 
Raiffeisenbank   2008 
Raiffeisen stavební spořitelna 1993 
Stavební spořitelna České spořitelny 1994 
UniCredit Bank Czech Republic 1996 
Volksbank CZ 1997 
Wüstenrot hypoteční banka 2002 
Wüstenrot - stavební spořitelna 1993 
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Table constructed by the author based on Businessinfo.cz (n.d.). 
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Table 4 - Affiliates of Foreign Banks in Czech Republic 
Name of Bank 
Active 
Since 
AXA Bank Europe 2009 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Holland) 2006 
BRE Bank 2007 
COMMERZBANK Aktiengesellschaft 1992 
Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank 2005 
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft Filiale Prag 1993 
Fortis Bank SA/NV 2005 
HSBC Bank 1997 
ING Bank 1993 
Oberbank AG 2004 
Poštová banka 2009 
PRIVAT BANK AG DER Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Oberösterreich 2005 
Raiffeisenbank im Stiffland eG 1995 
Saxo Bank A/S 2009 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 1992 
Všeobecná úverová banka 1993 
Waldviertler Sparkasse von 1842 AG 1994 
Table constructed by the author based on Businessinfo.cz (n.d.). 
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Table 4 - Czech Banking System as of December 31, 
2010 
Period 
Total Assets 
(1000 EUR) 
Deposits and Loans 
from Clients (1000 
EUR) 
31.12.2010 579545 193763 
30.9.2010 520450 191462 
30.6.2010 575067 204662 
31.3.2010 526306 191112 
31.12.2009 553039 195405 
30.9.2009 533367 195489 
30.6.2009 557234 215860 
31.3.2009 578569 211859 
31.12.2008 551391 193512 
30.9.2008 470922 173999 
30.6.2008 478336 187574 
31.3.2008 447687 172771 
31.12.2007 459808 181966 
30.9.2007 400568 160016 
30.6.2007 385756 165799 
31.3.2007 366393 146968 
31.12.2006 366821 148359 
30.9.2006 340384 125035 
30.6.2006 345611 129815 
31.3.2006 321017 125248 
31.12.2005 341569 129054 
30.9.2005 315991 118556 
30.6.2005 303960 110674 
31.3.2005 259740 103927 
31.12.2004 283635 108717 
30.9.2004 256220 115102 
30.6.2004 261076 111344 
31.3.2004 216953 102932 
31.12.2003 227504 101217 
30.9.2003 201442 100833 
30.6.2003 193689 98495 
31.3.2003 195401 97140 
31.12.2002 220445 99007 
30.9.2002 201136 95310 
30.6.2002 217786 99173 
31.3.2002 221505 94844 
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Table constructed by the author based on ARAD (n.d.). 
After briefly visiting the history of the Czech banking, the paper that inspired the 
analytical part of this paper is introduced. 
 
6. Empirical Specifications 
The main inspiration the model for this paper was a paper written by the authors 
Kashyap and Stein “What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say About the 
Transmission o Monetary Policy?” (2000). The goal of the paper Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) was to examine cross-sectional differences in the way that the policy shocks 
impact different banks in order to prove the existence of the lending channel of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. More specifically, the authors focused on 
differences between banks of different sizes and varying balance sheet liquidity.  
As authors concur, for lending view to be applicable, Modigliani-Miller proposition for 
banks must be proven wrong. According to the proposition, banks can freely switch 
between bonds and deposits at the margin (Kashyap & Stein 2000). If that is true, the 
shocks to the deposits do not affect banks’ lending policy.  
It is also difficult to distinguish between the loan supply effects and loan demand effects. 
The lending view however assumes decrease in loan supply, so “to resolve this 
ambiguity, Kashyap, Stein and Blinder (1992) show that while a monetary contraction 
reduces bank lending, it increases commercial paper volume. This fact would seem to 
suggest an inward shift in loan supply, rather than an inward shift in loan demand” 
(Kashyap & Stein 2000, pg. 3).    
Due to previously mentioned difficulties with identification, the authors decided to 
observe the behaviour of individual banks rather than aggregate values. If their idea is 
right, the Modigliani-Miller theorem has to be wrong which means that banks cannot 
tap uninsured funding sources without frictions in the presence of monetary shocks. 
That also means that there would be stronger impact on some banks more than the 
others. When two similar banks which differ only in the strength of their balance sheet 
liquidity position and which do not have access to alternative sources of funding, the 
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bank with weaker position will cut its loans more profoundly when affected by 
monetary contraction. This led the authors to stating their main hypothesis: . 
L stands for the lending activity, B for balance sheet strength and M for monetary 
policy. Higher M means less restrictive policy. Second hypothesis is that the effect 
should be stronger for smaller banks (Kashyap & Stein 2000). 
The data set used by the authors consisted of quarterly data for all reporting banks from 
the period 1976Q1-1993Q2, which amounted for 962,530 bank-quarters later divided 
into several groups for further testing. In their models, they used natural logarithm of 
lending as explained variable and four lags of natural logarithm of lending, balance 
sheet strength, geographic control, monetary policy variable, time variable and GDP. 
They tried models with different specifications, initially using two-step regression 
approach, later also one-step due to possible overspecifiaction of the two-step model. 
Three alternative measures of monetary policy were used: so called narrative approach 
based on Boschen-Mills (1995) index rating Fed policy in each month in five stances 
from “strongly expansionary” to “strongly contractionary”; federal funds rate and 
flexible VAR model(Kashyap & Stein 2000).  
No matter what specifications of the model they used, the results were all approximately 
the same. According to the authors: “Within the class of small banks, changes in 
monetary policy matter more for the lending of those banks with the least liquid balance 
sheets. The results are for the most part strongly statistically significant, and are robust 
to a wide range of variations in estimation technique” (Kashyap & Stein 2000, pg. 29). 
Most other possible scenarios were disproved throughout the text, so at least for the 
studied period and area it seems difficult to deny the presence of the lending channel. 
However, this result does not say how important the lending channel is for aggregate 
economic activity (Kashyap & Stein 2000). 
 
7. The Problems with Panel Data Sets in Finance 
There could be multiple issues with model robustness as suggested in Kashyap & Stein 
(2000). To address these issues, the advice given in Petersen (2008) on methods of 
estimation of standard errors in panel data sets is utilized. The author warns against 
fallibility and insufficiency of the information provided in literature analyzed in his text. 
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The goal of his paper is to compare the methods and help the reader to choose the 
correct method. The most common forms of dependence in finance applications take 
two forms. The first is the correlation of the firm’s residuals across years, also known as 
time-series dependence or unobserved firm effect. The second is the correlation of the 
year’s residuals across different firms, also known as cross-sectional dependence or 
time effect. The author simulates panel data using both forms, individually and jointly 
as well, to estimate coefficients and standard errors for each method and then to 
compare their relative performance. He starts with examining “the sensitivity of 
standard error estimates to the presence of a firm fixed effect” (Petersen 2008, pg. 436) 
which can be often observed among variables such as dividends, financial leverage, and 
investment. As assessed by the author, only clustered standard errors provide unbiased 
results because the residual dependence due to the firm effect is accounted for by this 
method (Petersen 2008, pg 436).  
One of the methods to deal with two sources of correlation proposed in Petersen (2008) 
is to “parametrically estimate one of the dimensions (e.g. by including dummy 
variables)” (Petersen 2008, pg. 458). Usually, the dummies are used of individual time 
periods as there are more firms as opposed to years in many panel data sets and this 
approach absorbs the time effect. Subsequently, the data is fixed by firm (Petersen 2008, 
pg. 458). In the case of fixed time effect, “the time dummies completely remove the 
correlation between observations in the same time period” (Petersen 2008, pg. 458), so 
only a firm effect remains in the data. Standard errors that are clustered by firm do not 
suffer from bias, while OLS as well as Fama-MacBeth standard error do in this case 
(Petersen 2008). 
To make the parametric approach work, we need to correctly specify the dependence 
(Petersen 2008, pg. 458). The problem is that “if the time effect is not fixed, then time 
dummies will not remove the dependence completely and even standard errors clustered 
by firm can be biased” (Petersen 2008, pg. 458).   The preference for a less parametric 
approach can then arise from the fact that many researchers do not know the exact form 
of the dependence. A viable alternative possibility for this case is to cluster on both 
dimensions at the same time. Petersen (2008) introduces an estimation of the variance-
covariance matrix proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) and Thompson 
(2006) such as following:  
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in which the standard errors are clustered by both firm and time. The first term stands 
for the standard errors that are clustered by firm. The second term stands for the 
standard errors that are clustered by time. Both these terms contain unspecified 
correlation between the two variables (correlation between observations with the firm 
fixed and varying years or the other way round). To avoid such double counting, “the 
White variance-covariance matrix is subtracted” (Petersen 2008, pg. 458). 
The author concludes that “the standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased and 
produce correctly sized confidence intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or 
temporary”  (Petersen 2008, pg. 475) while most other methods proposed in the 
literature that were tested by the author produced biased standard errors. “OLS, White, 
Newey-West (modified for panel dadta sets), Fama-MacBeth, or Fama-MacBeth 
corrected for first-order autocorrelation” (Petersen 2008, pg. 475) all failed to produce 
unbiased standard errors. Time effect makes things bit more complicated. In such case 
Fama-MacBeth gives unbiased standard errors as well as confidence intervals of a 
correct size (Petersen 2008, pg. 475). The same goes for standard errors that are 
clustered by time, however only if there are enough clusters (Petersen 2008, pg. 475). 
The rest of the text provides the reader with guidance how to choose the correct 
methods.  
As the dataset in this paper suffered from firm effect, the standard errors were clustered 
by firm, while the time effect was not a problem. 
The model developed by Kashyap and Stein (2000) inspired the model in this paper. 
Due to a vast difference in the size of the datasets – none of the datasets used for this 
paper had more than 300 observations while the dataset used by Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) had almost a million observations – the model used here is only a one step model. 
First, several models with different specifications were tested and later the best fitting 
model was transformed to adjust for the firm clustering effect described in the previous 
section. 
Data for the model was extracted from the Bankscope database mostly and it was drawn 
from November and December 2010 version of the database. After carefully combining 
consolidated and unconsolidated data for different banks (only unconsolidated data for 
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banks with no subsidiaries was added) the dataset contained 267 observations from the 
years 1992 to 2009 in the version for the final model. Additional data, such as historical 
discount rates, was obtained from the web pages of the Czech National Bank. The initial 
versions of the model contained several variables, some of which were discarded 
because of their statistical insignificance. As the explained variable, a difference of 
natural logarithm of loans provided by the bank in the year was used. For explanatory 
variables, series of values were used. After testing models containing also trend dummy, 
lag of GDP and others, a simpler model was chosen. First monetary policy proxy was 
designed as a proxy shock estimated as a difference between actual value of overnight 
interest rate and estimated value from autoregressive model with four lags. This proxy 
however had opposite effect on lending than expected, possibly because of demand 
shocks. Different proxy was thus used – a relevant Czech Central Bank rate for discount 
rates (CNB, n.d.). The final model then came in two versions. First version contains 
difference of natural logarithm of lending for each bank in relevant year as dependent 
variable and natural logarithm of lagged total assets (proxy for size of the bank), change 
in monetary proxy, an interaction term of a change in monetary proxy and lagged 
balance sheet strength (balance sheet strength was calculated as a ratio of cash and 
securities to total assets) and lagged balance sheet strength. Second version excluded the 
interaction term. The models and the results follow:  
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Model – version with interaction term 
 
 
List of variables: 
Dependent:  
 change in natural logarithm of loans 
Independents: 
 Lagged natural logarithm of total assets 
 Change in CNB target rate (as of November) 
 Interaction term (Change in CNB target rate * Lagged balance sheet strength) 
 Lagged balance sheet strength (calculated as a ratio of cash and securities to total 
assets) 
Preliminary results 
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln⁡(Lt ) 
Independent 
Variable 
All Data 
Large Banks Small Banks 
(total assets > median) (total assets < median) 
ln⁡(At-1) -0.035  -0.087*** -0.089    
∆Mt  -0.011 -0.037* -0.018  
∆Mt*Bt-1  0.023  0.163  0.098   
Bt-1  -0.308  -0.021 -1.110  
Constant  0.664** 1.228*** 1.204  
Observations    267 137 130 
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
Model – version without interaction term 
 
Preliminary results 
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln⁡(Lt ) 
Independent 
Variable 
All Data Large Banks Small Banks 
  (total assets > median) (total assets < median) 
ln⁡(At-1) -0.036  -0.084*** -0.095 
∆Mt   -0.006 -0.005 0.001    
Bt-1  -0.226 0.390 -0.703    
Constant  0.654*** 1.098*** 1.189    
Observations    267 137 130 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 To ensure statistic significance, data had to undergo data transformation suggested in 
paper Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches 
by Petersen (2008) for clustered standard error estimates.  
The statistical significance of all the results was at least at 20 % significance level. The 
banks were divided into two subdatasets according to size, with large banks being those 
with total assets larger than median of total assets and small banks being those with total 
assets smaller than median of total assets. What we are interested in are the effects of 
monetary proxy change on the difference in natural logarithm of loans and the effects of 
balance sheet strength. We can see that the effects of change in monetary policy are 
stronger for larger banks in this dataset. This could be for example due to the fact that 
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some of the smaller banks have more specialized type of business. However there is no 
strict distinction between banks in the Czech Republic as it is in the USA, so it is 
difficult to exclude any small banks just based on the data available. We can also see 
that the interaction term influences the lending in the expected direction.  
The model should be rerun in future with larger dataset as soon as this is attainable. The 
results so far are not very convincing as far as the strength of the lending channel of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the Czech Republic goes. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The contemporary importance of monetary policy is hardly deniable. However, as many 
studies cited in this paper prove, most of the channels of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy are weak. If the authorities do not want to resign on the monetary 
policy, they must take actions to counter the factors weakening the mechanism. As can 
be seen from the model developed in this paper, the strength of the lending channel in 
the Czech Republic remains questionable, even though possibly due to the insufficiency 
of the dataset. Few examples of such measures have been presented, such as control and 
regulations over non-banking loan providers, cooperation among central banks and 
power to break up financial conglomerates. The public representatives should however 
deeply consider pros and cons before applying any of these measures. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1 – Number of Banks in the Czech Republic in Years 1990 – 2004  
 
Graph was created by the author based on the data form CNB (2001) and CNB (2004). 
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Figure 2 – Number of Banks in the Czech Republic in Years 1990 – 2004 Divided 
Based on Ownership Structure 
 
Graph was created by the author based on the data form CNB (2001) and CNB (2004). 
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Figure 3 – Graph of discount rates in the Czech Republic over the years 1990 – 2009  
 
Graph was created by the author based on the data from ARAD (n.d.) 
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Figure 4 - Czech Banking System as of December 31, 2010 
 
Graph was created by the author based on the data from ARAD (n.d.) 
 
